Machine Safety Circuits: STO vs SS1, Stop Categories, PL / SIL, Dual Channels and EDM

Two conclusions come first: a safety circuit does not live inside an ordinary PLC program, and the "Cat" in "Cat0 / Cat1 / Cat2" is not the same word as the "Cat" in "Cat3 / PL e" — the first is an IEC 60204-1 stop category, the second an ISO 13849-1 architecture category, and confusing them leads to choosing the wrong stopping method.

🚨 Scope and compliance: IEC 60204-1 (electrical equipment of machines, stop categories), ISO 13849-1 (SRP/CS architecture categories and PL), IEC 61800-5-2 (drive safety functions such as STO / SS1), ISO 13850 (emergency stop design), ISO 12100 (risk reduction hierarchy), IEC 62061 (SIL) and related standards are copyright texts. This page only distinguishes concepts and gives lookup navigation; it reproduces no clause text and cites no clause numbers, so that second-hand summaries are not mistaken for the standard. Clause numbers and editions must be taken from the standards themselves and the machine documentation. The definitions of stop categories, the STO / SS1 mapping, common PL e / Cat 3 or 4 / SIL 3 design targets, the EDM definition and the reasons an ordinary PLC output cannot form a safety function come from the published JEMA functional-safety PLC guideline, drive manufacturer operating manuals and third-party safety engineering material. Quantified claims such as “single-channel STO is at most PL c” come from third-party material and were not verified against the standard text here; they are design hints, not compliance rulings. The achievable PL / SIL must be established by risk assessment, certified component data and whole-machine validation, and varies with machine type, local regulation and builder design. Wiring, modification and bypassing of safety circuits involve personal risk and must be performed by qualified personnel following the standards, the risk assessment and the builder’s written procedure, with records retained. This page is not wiring, selection or modification guidance, and offers no downloads, file mirrors, cloud drives or packaged archives of standards.

广告

30-Second Triage: Identify Which Problem You Are Solving

QuestionWhich system to openFirst discrimination line
Should E-stop remove torque immediately or ramp down firstIEC 60204-1 stop categories 0 / 1 / 2Category 2 keeps power and cannot be used for E-stop
Dual channels, diagnostic coverage, achievable PLISO 13849-1 architecture categories B / 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 and PL a-eArchitecture categories are a different numbering system from stop categories
How to use the STO / SS1 terminals on a driveIEC 61800-5-2 drive safety functionsSTO maps to stop category 0, SS1 to category 1
Can an ordinary PLC transistor output drive STO directlyQualification of devices in a safety-related control systemNo; non-safety devices are not counted in PL calculations
Safety relay reports a cross fault and will not resetDual-channel consistency and EDM feedbackCheck both inputs and external contact feedback
Vertical axis drops after E-stopStop category and mechanical brakeSTO does not prevent gravitational drop

Table 0. Six problem classes and the first discrimination line

Fanuc Emergency Stop Circuit covers the signal chain and “reset but still not ready”, while Heidenhain TNC Guard Doors Are Open covers four-layer safety-chain localisation; both are troubleshooting oriented. This page only classifies concepts and does not replace machine-specific diagnosis.

1. Two Kinds of Category: Stop 0/1/2 versus Architecture B/1/2/3/4

Two kinds of category: IEC 60204-1 stop categories 0/1/2 and ISO 13849-1 architecture categories B/1/2/3/4

This is the main correction to the circulating brief, which lists “Cat0 / Cat1 / Cat2 / Cat3 criteria” under “defined by ISO 13849”. Those are two different concepts in two different standards.

SystemNumberingWhat it describesTypical valuesCommon misuse
IEC 60204-1 stop categories0 / 1 / 2How the machine stops and when power is removed0: immediate power removal; 1: controlled stop then power removal; 2: controlled stop with power retainedTreating category 2 as valid for E-stop
IEC 61800-5-2 drive safety functionsSTO / SS1 / SS2 and othersWhich safety function the drive implementsSTO maps to stop category 0, SS1 to category 1Reading STO as “stop and hold position”
ISO 13849-1 architecture categoriesB / 1 / 2 / 3 / 4Structure and fault-detection capability of the safety-related control partAssessed together with PL a-eReading “Cat 3” as stop category 3
IEC 62061SIL 1 / 2 / 3Failure-probability level of safety-related control systemsRelated to PL but a separate systemWriting “SIL 3 is mandatory on every machine”
ISO 13850 / ISO 12100PrinciplesE-stop design principles and the risk reduction hierarchyE-stop is a complementary protective measure, not the primary risk reductionAssuming risk is controlled because an E-stop is fitted

Table 1. Five conceptual systems in separate columns

One directly applicable rule: an E-stop may only use stop category 0 or 1, because both end with power removed; category 2 leaves power available at standstill and carries a restart-on-fault risk. Meanwhile “PL e / Cat 3 or 4 / SIL 3” is a common design target for industrial drive integration, not a universal requirement — the required level comes from the risk assessment. Third-party material suggests a single-channel STO reaches roughly PL c and that a dual-channel safety relay driving dual STO inputs is the conventional route to higher levels; such quantified claims must be checked against the standard text and component certificates, and are not ruled on here.

2. STO versus SS1: The Real Difference Between Category 0 and 1

STO versus SS1: STO removes torque immediately and the load coasts, SS1 ramps down then removes torque after a monitored delay
DimensionSTO (Safe Torque Off)SS1 (Safe Stop 1)
Corresponding stop categoryCategory 0: immediate removal of power to actuators, uncontrolled stopCategory 1: controlled stop with power available, then power removed
Drive behaviourGate signals to the output stage are removed so the motor cannot produce torqueDrive ramps down, an external safety circuit monitors a delay, then STO engages at timeout or standstill
Standstill monitoringNot provided; no position holdingRamp is monitored; STO still removes torque at the end
Vertical / gravity axisCoasting or gravitational drop is handled by a mechanical brake; STO itself does not prevent itOften selected when inertia coast-down distance matters, but the brake is still required
If the controlled stop failsNot applicableTorque must still be removed when the safety delay expires; this is what makes category 1 acceptable for E-stop
Basis of the delay settingNot applicableMeasured stopping time at worst-case load plus a margin, recorded in the validation file

Table 2. Six differences between STO and SS1

The classic field misreading is “STO fitted means the machine stops safely”: STO only stops producing torque, so a high-inertia spindle may coast for a long time and a vertical axis may drop. The stopping method therefore comes from the risk assessment, not from the parts list. Brake timing on gravity axes is covered in Fanuc Gravity-Axis Brake, and the Siemens side in 840D sl Safety Integrated Alarms.

3. Four Architectures: Who Makes the Final Decision

ArchitectureDecision deviceAchievable level directionAdvantageCost and boundary
Dedicated safety relayDual-channel relay with force-guided contactsDepends on certificates and dual-channel wiring; covers most single-function casesFixed logic, straightforward wiring, bypass requires physical rewiring and is visible at auditWiring grows quickly with logic complexity
Safety PLC / safety busCertified safety PLC with PROFIsafe, CIP Safety, Safety over EtherCAT and similarHigh levels remain achievable with complex logicMany safety functions in one place, rich diagnosticsNeeds a certified development process, version control and validation records
Ordinary PLC transistor outputOne general-purpose PLC outputCannot form a safety functionLowest cost, easy to reprogramSingle-channel faults undetectable, no self-test, failure rates uncertified, excluded from PL; bypass is one ladder edit
HybridSafety circuit decides; ordinary PLC receives read-only statusDetermined by the safety circuitHost can display, log and “request a stop”Ordinary PLC may request but must not veto; software watchdogs and heartbeats are not accepted in formal assessment

Table 3. Four architectures compared

The hybrid row is the one most often written incorrectly. The safety circuit (relay or safety PLC) takes E-stops, guard interlocks and light curtains directly and drives the STO inputs directly; the host or ordinary PLC receives one status output for logging and may issue a soft-stop request, but cannot prevent the safety circuit from triggering a stop. That “read-only status, never veto” boundary has a counterpart in How to Use FANUC PMC Force Output: forcing a signal is a diagnostic tool, not a substitute for a safety function.

4. Why an Ordinary PLC Output Cannot Drive STO

Ordinary PLC output: undetectable single-channel faults, no force-guided contacts, excluded from PL, software heartbeats not accepted
ReasonConcrete failure modeWhat the safety circuit provides instead
Single-channel faults are undetectableOutput short, open circuit or welded contact still looks like the stop command was sentDual channels, cross-fault detection and a safe state on disagreement
No force-guided contacts or self-testA welded ordinary relay contact cannot be discovered by logicForce-guided contacts mechanically link NO and NC states
Timing is not certifiableScan time, bus latency and firmware downloads sit between E-stop contact closure and STO de-energisingHardwired safety circuit independent of the CNC program and fieldbus
Failure rates are excluded from PLGeneral-purpose PLC failure data is not functionally safety certifiedOnly certified component PFHd / MTTFd enters the PL calculation
Bypass is cheapOne ladder edit or one HMI button removes the safety functionBypass needs physical rewiring and is immediately visible at audit
Software “safety” is not acceptedWatchdogs, heartbeats, host ROS nodesUseful engineering value, but no substitute in formal assessment

Table 4. Six reasons it cannot be wired that way

One more principle is often missed: E-stop is a complementary protective measure, not the primary means of risk reduction. Risk reduction comes from inherently safe design, guards and the safety functions themselves. E-stop buttons must latch and use a positive-opening (direct-opening) contact structure, and the reset action alone must not restart the machine; verify these principles in the standards and the builder’s documentation, since no clause numbers are quoted here. The CNC-side signal chain is described in Fanuc Emergency Stop Circuit.

5. Dual Channels, Force-Guided Contacts and EDM

广告
ElementPurposeIf omitted
Two normally closed channelsOne channel can still cut power when the other fails, and disagreement is detectableA single fault loses the safety function
Positive-opening E-stop buttonMechanical structure forces the contact open, independent of springs or electronicsA welded or jammed contact makes the button ineffective
Force-guided relay contactsNO and NC contacts are mechanically linked, so the feedback contact is trustworthyFeedback can contradict the real output state
Cross-short detectionDetects shorts between the two channels and cross-wiringSafety relay reports a cross fault and refuses to reset
EDM (External Device Monitoring)Safety relay or safety PLC reads back the real state of external contactors and drives, and stops its output on a discrepancyIf an external device does not open as expected, the fault latches and re-enable is refused
Status signal as read-only uplinkFeeds PLC / HMI display and logsIf writable, it creates a path for a non-safety system to veto the safety function

Table 5. Six elements and the consequence of omitting each

EDM is defined in the JEMA functional-safety PLC guideline as follows: external devices such as E-stop switches and magnetic contactors have no self-diagnostic function of their own, so the safety controller checks their actions and stops its output if anything is abnormal — also called back-check. The typical “what happens if I omit it” symptom is: the safety output has opened but the drive feedback never returns, so the relay latches a fault and no amount of resetting enables the machine. That is the same trap as “PLC shows E-stop OK but the drive never powers up” in Fanuc Emergency Stop Circuit: a status word is not the real safety output state.

6. Commissioning and Periodic Tests

Four commissioning steps: press each E-stop, measure stopping time, verify STO de-energised on every drive, record and retest
StepActionWhat to record
1Press every E-stop button and actuate each guard switch or light curtain, confirming each one triggersTrigger point and corresponding drive object
2Measure stopping time at worst-case load, set the SS1 delay with a marginMeasured value, delay setting and its basis
3Confirm the STO inputs of every relevant drive are actually de-energised, not just that the screen shows E-stopState and measurement point for each drive
4Retest periodically and after any modification, following the standards and the builder's procedureTest date, results, deviations and corrective actions

Table 6. Four commissioning steps and the record

Three boundaries. First, stopping time must be measured rather than copied from a datasheet; the delay must cover worst-case load, and a failed ramp must still end with torque removed by the safety timeout. Second, marking, colour coding and documentation requirements follow the applicable standards and the builder’s design; no clause numbers are quoted here so that second-hand notes are not mistaken for the standard. Third, for nuisance trips in thunderstorm season or intermittent cross faults, check surge protection, shielding and dual-channel wiring before replacing components. Reading the relevant drawings is covered in How to Read a CNC Machine Electrical Schematic.

7. Common Fault Readings and Site Index

SymptomMore likely directionGo to
PLC shows E-stop OK but drives do not enableStatus signal is not the real safety output
Safety relay cross fault, will not resetChannel disagreement or missing EDM feedbackSection 5 above
Vertical axis drops after E-stopWrong stop category or brake timing
Repeated guard-door alarmsFour-layer safety-chain localisation
Siemens-side safety alarmsSPL, safety mode and related machine data
Tempted to bypass with a PMC force signalSafety red line, not a substitute
Random alarms from 24 V sagPhysical root cause upstream
“Do not merge two systems into one” in another domainSame class of error
Electrical drawings and wire-number lookupBackground reading

Table 7. Nine symptoms and further reading

Frequently Asked Questions

What is the difference between STO and SS1, and when is SS1 required?

STO corresponds to IEC 60204-1 stop category 0: gate signals to the drive output stage are removed immediately, the motor produces no torque, and the load stops through friction or a mechanical brake; it does not monitor standstill and does not prevent a vertical axis from dropping. SS1 corresponds to category 1: the drive decelerates under control, an external safety circuit monitors a delay, and STO engages at timeout or standstill; even if the ramp fails, torque must still be removed when the safety delay expires, which is why category 1 is acceptable for an E-stop. When coast-down distance of a high-inertia load is unacceptable, or a gravity axis has significant drift, a risk assessment will usually point to SS1 plus a mechanical brake rather than STO alone. The stopping method is determined by the risk assessment and the builder’s design, not ruled on here.

Can an ordinary PLC transistor output be wired directly to a drive STO input?

No. A short, open circuit or welded contact on a single output cannot be detected, and an ordinary relay has neither force-guided contacts nor self-test. PLC scan time and bus latency fall between E-stop contact closure and STO de-energising, and general-purpose PLC failure rates are not functionally safety certified, so they cannot enter a PL calculation. Software watchdogs, heartbeats and host nodes are not accepted in formal assessment, and bypassing takes a single ladder edit. The correct architecture uses a safety relay or safety PLC with dual-channel, force-guided outputs driving the STO inputs directly, while an ordinary PLC receives at most one read-only status signal for display and logging: it may request a stop but must never veto the safety function. Wiring, selection and validation must be performed by qualified personnel following the standards, the risk assessment and the builder’s procedure.

What does EDM feedback do in a safety circuit, and what happens if it is omitted?

EDM (External Device Monitoring) is the safety relay or safety PLC reading back the real state of external devices: E-stop switches, magnetic contactors and drives have no self-diagnostic capability of their own, so the safety controller checks their actions through auxiliary contacts and stops its output when anything is abnormal. Omitting or miswiring it is a common reason a safety relay reports a cross fault and refuses to reset or re-enable. Also note that a status word is not the real output state: a PLC screen showing E-stop OK does not prove that every drive’s STO input is de-energised. Commissioning therefore means pressing each E-stop, measuring real stopping time, verifying STO de-energising on every drive, and retesting periodically with records, following the standards and the builder’s procedure. No clause numbers are quoted here; use the standards themselves for those.

Last updated: 2026-11-15

Where to go next

  • FANUC Troubleshooting — the full guide library: alarms, diagnosis numbers, servo, spindle, PMC and electrical faults, organised by symptom.
  • CNC Repair Tools — which instrument measures what: multimeters, clamp meters, insulation testers and oscilloscopes, with the specification that actually matters.
  • Remote Technical Support — have the readings reviewed with you: alarm reverse lookup, PMC ladder analysis and servo tuning advice by call. Repair companies and integrators welcome.

Read the guide, get the right instrument, or walk the diagnosis through with someone — pick whichever you need.

Also available in Chinese: 机床安全回路怎么接才合规?STO / SS1 与四类架构:停止类别、PL / SIL 等级、双通道与 EDM 回读
The original Chinese version — same procedure, with the full field notes.
© 版权声明
THE END
喜欢就支持一下吧
点赞9赞赏 分享
评论 抢沙发

请登录后发表评论

    暂无评论内容

CNC电气调试问题解答 | 数控机床电气工程师资料共享屋
CNC电气调试问题解答 | 数控机床电气工程师资料共享屋
CNC电气调试问题解答 | 数控机床电气工程师资料共享屋
CNC电气调试问题解答 | 数控机床电气工程师资料共享屋
CNC电气调试问题解答 | 数控机床电气工程师资料共享屋
CNC电气调试问题解答 | 数控机床电气工程师资料共享屋
图片-CNCShare | 数控电气技术中心
图片-CNCShare | 数控电气技术中心
图片-CNCShare | 数控电气技术中心
图片-CNCShare | 数控电气技术中心
图片-CNCShare | 数控电气技术中心
图片-CNCShare | 数控电气技术中心
FANUC 0i-B / 0i-C 老系统报警速查:同号异义 + 920/930/950 换板还是查线-CNCShare | 数控电气技术中心
数控报警号形态与号段总索引:FANUC / 西门子 / 三菱 / 海德汉 / 华中 / 广数 / 新代 / 科德 八品牌对照 + 这条报警该找谁-CNCShare | 数控电气技术中心
Fanuc Alarm, Parameter and Diagnostic Cross-Reference Table: Verified SV / PS / OH Anchors and the Two Numbering Generations-CNCShare | 数控电气技术中心
FANUC 报警号 ↔ 参数号 ↔ 诊断号 三向反查总表:SV / PS / OH 段已核实锚点 + 新老两代编号体系-CNCShare | 数控电气技术中心
FANUC CNC Simulation Software: the Official CNC Guide Family, Hardware-Key Licensing and the Free-Version Myth-CNCShare | 数控电气技术中心
FANUC 仿真软件怎么选?官方 CNC Guide 四件套、授权方式与「免费版」的合规边界-CNCShare | 数控电气技术中心
HEIDENHAIN iTNC 530 Manuals: NC Software Numbers versus Document IDs, the TNCguide Help System and FCL Function Limits-CNCShare | 数控电气技术中心
海德汉 iTNC 530 手册哪里找?NC 软件号与文档号是两套体系 + TNCguide 帮助系统装进机床 + FCL 功能边界-CNCShare | 数控电气技术中心
Spindle Runout: Four-Layer Diagnosis, the Two-Point Test Arbor Split and Taper Contact Pattern Checking-CNCShare | 数控电气技术中心
主轴跳动太大怎么调?四层排查(轴承预紧 / 锥孔接触率 / 刀柄夹紧 / 联轴器同轴度)+ 两点法分流判据与判据来源纪律-CNCShare | 数控电气技术中心
机床打表找正怎么做?检具选择、标准流程、五项常见几何误差的调整部位与「检验 ≠ 找正」分层-CNCShare | 数控电气技术中心
Machine Geometric Accuracy Check and Adjustment Framework: ISO 230-1 vs ISO 230-2, Error Families, Instruments, Tolerance Provenance and Adjustment Locations-CNCShare | 数控电气技术中心
文章精选
专心做好一件事
打造更优雅的WordPress主题-CNCShare | 数控电气技术中心
专心做好一件事
打造更优雅的WordPress主题